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THE CRISIS IN THE SCOTTISH COAL INDUSTRY 
Suzanne Najam 
Introduction 
Nineteen eighty eight saw the unprecedented spectacle of two major 
nationalised power industries engaged in a legal battle in the Scottish courts 
to resolve issues with far-reaching ramifications for the Scottish economy. 
On 1st March 1988, after months of fruitless negotiations, British Coal 
(BC) sought an interim interdict against the South of Scotland Electricity 
Board (SSEB) in order to prevent the electricity board from accepting 
tenders from foreign suppliers of coal, (from which the latter argued it 
could buy more cheaply than from BC), by claiming that there were pre-
existing contracts to supply Longannet and Cockenzie power stations with 
coal from Scottish pits into the 1990s. This interim interdict was granted to 
the coal industry, but was later set aside in an attempt to conciliate the 
SSEB and provide the grounds upon which to negotiate for a long-term 
contract to provide Scottish deep-mined coal to the power stations. 
However, despite a three month negotiating period during which no 
imported coal would be burnt at the two power stations mentioned, the 
SSEB continued to buy coal from foreign sources. The main supplier, for 
these contracts, Shell, is said to have made a loss in its eagerness to secure 
the market. When the two sides met on the 30th June 1988 in order to seek 
ways to extend the ceasefire, it was these stocks of imported coal, 
amounting to 1 million tonnes, which were to prove the stumbling block to 
finding a settlement. For although prices and tonnages were agreed for a 
further nine months, the SSEB still insisted that it wished to burn the 
foreign coal at power stations other than the inefficient Kincardine station, 
which was not covered by the interim interdict, and which is estimated as 
having one-tenth of the combined power of Longannet and Cockenzie; BC, 
on the other hand, sought to ensure that some 750,000 tonnes would be 
burnt solely at Kincardine station. 
On the surface, much of the controversy can be apportioned to an 
intransigent SSEB, eager to improve its financial and organisational 
position in the years prior to privatisation. The SSEB balance sheet looked 
particularly poor after an over-investment in unnecessary capacity, notably 
Torness, had put its total debts for 1987/88 at £1.82 billion. Financial 
advisors to the SSEB, and the Scottish Office, had informed the utility that 
its profit margin must be improved in the run-up to privatisation to increase 
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its attractiveness. The new strategy of cutting costs must certainly be seen in 
this light. Yet there are also more practical problems for BC. With Torness 
coming on stream, previous investment in Hunterston 'B', and with 
Inverkip able to burn more oil since 1986, the SSEB's demand for Scottish 
coal has fallen. This is evidenced in its reduced need for coal from 
Monktonhall, which BC duly closed. It is for these reasons that the SSEB 
has sought only a one or two year contract, and to overturn the longer-term 
commitment to take Scottish coals for Longannet and Cockenzie. BC, in 
turn, has argued that not only has it invested £60 million in the new 
Castle bridge extension to Longannet, but that it needs a long-term contract 
until the end of the 1990s in order to plan its deep mine policy, necessary 
due to the massive input of planning and investment involved, and to 
ensure the redevelopment of the Frances Colliery in Fife. 
Yet in many ways BC has wilfully, if unwittingly, placed itself in the 
unenviable position wherein it must resort to court action to keep the 
contract of its most significant customer as a result of the policies it has 
followed since the late 1970s. It is the purpose of this article, therefore, to 
trace, albeit briefly, the major ways in which, in this 'battle of the giants', 
BC has, by its own policies, exacerbated the weak position in which it now 
finds itself. 
Governmental Policies and their Consequences for the Coal Industry 
The 1980s have witnessed an international expansion in coal 
production, which can be seen as having developed from a growing concern 
from the early 1970s about oil reserves and supplies, and worries about 
nuclear energy. This increased world production, with resultant drives by 
foreign coal suppliers to secure markets, has served to lower world prices 
below the costs of production. Yet the same period has seen a contraction in 
the Scottish mining industry, as with the British coalfield as a whole, which 
has acted to enhance the exposure of Scottish coals to foreign competition. 
This has been, in no small way, the consequence of governmental policies 
since 1979. 
The undermining of the coal industry by the Tory government is the 
result of two central thrusts of its ideological position; the first political, the 
second economic. The first factor is intimately connected to the seeming 
defeat of Heath's government at the hands of the National Union of Mine-
Workers (NUM) in 1972 and 1974. It was in the climate of this apparent 
crisis that a report was sent to Derek Ezra by Wilfred Miron, National Coal 
Board member with Regional Responsibilities, in December 1973. In this 
document Miron sets out changes which would counter the potential threat 
from the Miners' Union in the future. He produced a programme which 
would implement technological changes, especially automated processes; 
alter payment structures; redirect investment to 'moderate' areas; limit 
future manning; remove 'subversive political influences', and ensure that 
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as many employed as possible were outwith the NUM. Managerial 
attitudes were to be reorientated in compliance with the new proposals. 
The requirements for such moves hinged on Miron's perception of the 
political militancy of the miners. A quotation from this document serves to 
indicate its tone:-
"We must keep in mind that the strategy of the NUM's Executive will 
become increasingly politically oriented and that its Left-Wing 
(Communists, Marxistsand their ilk, however organisationally 
fragmented) will maintain a unified strategy towards the ideological 
end- the overthrow of the present 'system' .... These Left Wingers 
now in office, or to achieve office, are not going to be changed; they 
will not be diverted from their political dedication< ll." 
The activities surrounding the report were to be kept quiet yet Saville 
argues that by 1979 "the Miron proposals were mostly in place, or in 
process, aided by new micro-processor technology(2)." Evidence for this 
claim, and the effects for Scotland, can be seen from later arguments. Of 
greater public knowledge is the set of plans known as the Ridley Report, 
which was the final report of the Ridley Committee, leaked to The 
Economist on the 27th May 1978. It laid out a strategy for challenge from 
what it called a 'vulnerable industry', such as coke, which operated with 
•·the full force of communist disruptors." The report stated:-
"The group believes that the most likely battleground will be the coal 
industry. They would like a Thatcher government to: (a) build up 
maximum coal stocks, particularly at the power stations; (b) make 
contigency plans for the import of coal; (c) encourage the 
recruitment of non-union lorry drivers by haulage companies to help 
move coal where necessary; (d) introduce dual coal/oil firing in all 
power stations as quickly as possibte<3l." 
These two reports serve to demonstrate the preparedness of hostile 
forces within the NCB and Tory party to augment policy decisions for 
overtly political ends but which, as will be seen later, would also have 
important ramifications for the economic state of BC in the 1980s. We can 
see in such documents a political desire to lessen dependence upon coal in 
order to undermine the miners' industrial power. It could be argued that it 
is as a result of this desire that Britain has been the only country with 
indigeneous fuel supplies to invest heavily in nuclear power; investing 
around £10 billion in nuclear generating stations. Yet such strategies have 
also been supplemented by Conservative economic policies which have 
sought, financially at least, to lessen the ties between government and the 
nationalised industries. The demand by government for BC to break even, 
now set for 1988/9, has also been crucially connected to BC's policies in the 
1980s. 
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BC Super-Pit Strategy and the Scottish Coal Industry 
The financial restrictions placed on BC means that its recent policies 
have focused on ways in which costs could be cut whilst maintaining 
maximum output. To these ends, emphasis has been placed increasingly 
upon a 'super-pit' strategy. This has involved substantial investment in both 
new pits, (the best known of which is Selby, which cost£1.5 billion), and in 
new roadways linking some existing pits to greatly improve the time miners 
can work at the face each shift. This has operated in conjunction with the 
new advanced automation processes known as MINOS, (Mines Operating 
System). This system acts to increase the productivity of capital, reduce 
manpower and give greater managerial control over work processes. All of 
this was foreshadowed in the Miron Report, and formed the basis of the 
investment policies pursued by the NCB during the Labour government of 
1974-79. However, the MINOS systems are best operationalised in pits 
where uncertainty in mining conditions is reduced to a minimum. The 
super-pit strategy consequently has been concentrated in the central 
coalfield where the geological conditions are more suitable to systems 
engineering, and in all cases has sought to place emphasis on production, 
associated with drastic reductions in manpower, and for one main 
purchaser, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). It is thus a 
production-oriented strategy, rather than a market-led one. 
BC's policies were to have crucial effects for the Scottish industry. The 
domination of the CEGB, and SSEB, over BC's concerns means that BC 
has chosen to undervalue other potential markets; in particular, domestic 
and coking coals, and anthracite. Thus it has rundown its specialised 
products in favour of coal for the power stations, served by English super-
pits. National funding in the 1980s has been available only for pits serving 
the power station market, whilst other forms of expenditure have had to be 
met from local resources. BC policy has consequently become overly-
reliant on the CEGB and SSEB, and those pits unable to participate in the 
major market were to be those that were closed. Between 1979 and the end 
of March 1988 the number of collieries in Britain dropped from 319 to 96. In 
Scotland the position has become virtually terminal as, within the same 
period, the fall has been from 16 to 4; Bilston Glen, Barony, and Sol girth 
and Castlebridge, both in the Lon gannet Complex. The numbers employed 
have fallen from 21,000 to a mere 3,000. 
BC's policies have served to make Scotland peripheral to its concerns. 
Both political and economic factors are important to this trend. Within the 
arguments laid down by Miron in the early 1970s, Scotland was seen as a 
politically 'unmoderate' area, where the communist president Mick 
McGahey and the young 'Marxist' Eric Clarke, later to become General 
Secretary of the Scottish Area NUM, were singled out for especial 
mention. It was in such an area that Miron believed moves should be made 
to lessen the power of the miners. Yet the technological side of his strategy 
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also effectively managed to exclude the Scottish coalfield from being a main 
part of the NCB's plans, for it was unable to participate within the super-pit 
strategy due to more complicated geological conditions. These conditions 
require conventional management techniques due to a wider variety of 
underground environments than are found in the central English coalfield. 
The coalfield was thus doubly disadvantaged. Scotland has consequently 
been caught within a downward spiral wherein lack of investment has led to 
worsening Machine Available Time, (MAT), stagnation, rundown and 
final closures. 
In 1987/88 BC claimed that all of Scotland's deep mines were 
uneconomic. Yet this claim is open to some considerable debate, for it 
hinges upon the particular accounting system used by BC<4l. In order to 
understand the crisis facing the Scottish industry it is, therefore, worthwhile 
to examine both the means by which Scotland's pits have been declared 
unproductive, and closed, over the last 9 years, and the problems which 
have confronted the Scottish Area, (now no more), which have engendered 
such an argument. 
Clearly, part of Scotland's peripheral status is related to its minor 
strategic importance to BC's major market, the CEGB, to which sales have 
declined over the last few years to insignificance; some 11,873 tonnes going 
incoast from Leith in 1987 compared to 400,000 tonnes in 1986. BC decides 
whether to take Scottish coals for the English power stations dependent 
upon English production with its current strategy being not to use Scottish 
coals if there is stockpiling in England. Thus, BC only turns to Scottish 
supplies if there are problems with English supplies; for example, industrial 
action or logistical problems. At national level, therefore, Scotland plays 
only a minor role in BC's overall plans. 
As was noted earlier, national funding largely goes to those areas 
which supply the power stations, which thus means that any Scottish 
investment must come from local resources; the exception being 
Castlebridge. However, under BC accounting systems, such major local 
investment counts as a loss against the area concerned, with minor 
developments being charged against the specific pit. For example, this was 
the case with the redevelopment of Polmaise, the cost of which was carried 
by the Scottish Area, and counted as a deficit in the accounts. This 
somewhat peculiar accounting system, which writes off investment as loss, 
acts to portray an even gloomier picture for the Scottish industry in two 
major additional ways. Firstly, although Scotland does not participate in 
large-scale national projects, with most funding going to Central England, 
interest payments on these are carried nationally by the 10 areas. 
According to the Latest Outturn Prospects, for example, the interest 
burden for 1988/9 will be some £430 million, to which the Scottish pits will 
contribute. Scotland, therefore, pays but does not receive. Secondly, the 
cost of pit closures is spread across the operating units, thus successive 
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closures put additional burdens upon remaining pits. Again, the Latest 
Outturn Prospects estimate that for 1988/9 net restructuring costs will 
amount to some £54 million, with this figure rising with further potential 
Scottish closures. Yet if such strategies serve to disadvantage peripheral 
areas such as Scotland and, as the Scottish Coalfield Project argues, 
exaggerate its losses, the actual means whereby economic viability is 
assessed also serves to jeopardise Scottish pits<5l. 
The major criteria whereby Scotland is judged as unecomic hinges 
upon the somewhat crude analysis of output per manshift, (OMS), costs per 
tonne, and profits and losses. Substantial criticisms of this method have 
been made by both the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the 
Scottish Coalfield Project<6l. The SCP, for example, argues that this fails to 
take into account that OMS is dependent not purely upon physical labour 
but also factors such as capital investment in both face and travelling 
machinery, and higher labour costs caused by overtime payments. If one 
adds to this the problems potentially caused by adverse geological 
conditions one can see how such judgements may serve to disadvantage 
Scottish pits over time. Such a situation acts as a 'Catch 22'. Scottish pits 
have been assessed by OMS figures which serves to 'establish' their 
unproductive nature, and then such judgements are used to determine 
whether pits should receive investment. However, low productivity may be 
seen as resulting from under-investment in the first instance. The SCP 
argues that all Scottish pits closed in the 1980s have been subject to under-
investment in the years prior to their closure, as, indeed, has the Scottish 
Area as a whole. For example, in 1987 investment in the Scottish Area was 
the second lowest of the 10 areas of the British coalfield, at a mere £13 
million, out of a total figure of £615 million; the lowest amount of £3 million 
going to the small Kent coalfield, and the largest amount, £232 million 
going to North Yorkshire.(7) 
The consequences of under-investment will be looked at in more detail 
in the next section, in which we shall examine the particular case of Seafield 
Colliery in Fife. For the moment what is of interest is the way in which this 
acts to undermine the Scottish coalfield. The crude guidelines used to 
establish a pit's worth, outlined above, have had two effects. Firstly, under-
investment as a result of BC decisions vitally affects the amount of MAT 
that is possible at a productive unit. Lack of financial input into the 
infrastructure of a pit lowers productivity in three potential ways; either by 
increasing the amount of time men take to get to the face by lack of 
investment in man-riding facilities, the use of out-moded equipment at the 
face, which may consequently be subject to breakdowns stopping 
production, or by leading to technological shortcomings in machinery to 
take coal to the surface which creates a bottleneck of coal underground. 
Thus, even whilst Scottish pits may not be suitable to all the high-cost 
investments in automated processes, under-investment in traditional 
engineering equipment may crucially impede a pit's performance. 
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Secondly, managerial decisions on the basis of the assessment of short -term 
productivity figures set against, again, short-term assessments of market 
demand, the need to break even or whatever, may result in pit closures 
which waste millions of pounds in closures, and further disadvantage 
remaining units. This progressive series of events resulting in economic 
catastrophe may be seen in relation to the closures of Highhouse, Sorn, 
Polkemmet, Comrie and Seafield, all of which suffered from declining 
MAT in the periods before closure between 1979 and 1988. 
Associated with under-investment and closures, however, have been 
additional problems which have had a severe impact on Scotland's pits; 
namely, the loss of manpower through redundancy as BC has sought to 
minimalise the costs of production, and demoralisation among the 
workforce resulting from occupational insecurity. Gaining momentum 
since the end of the miners' strike, the redundancy payments offered until 
March 1987 meant men could leave the industry with £1,000 for every year 
worked. A new scheme introduced later that year and lasting until March 
1988 was for redundancy terms which gave men with at least two years 
service a £5,000 bonus payment if they quit the industry before the end of 
the financial year. The eagerness with which increasingly younger men 
have chosen to leave the pits has been indicative of both low morale and 
faith in the industry. As Scottish miners have come to believe in the 
imminent demise of their pits, the choice has been one of choosing between 
staying in employment which may shortly be ended or leaving early with 
what is seen as a large sum of money. 
Yet with growing numbers leaving the pits, the situation within the 
remaining units has deteriorated. This 'culling' of the workforce has been 
largely unplanned, with Iitle thought to the types of worker leaving. 
Consequently, some pits have experienced a loss of skilled men who, if 
anything, have become doubly necessary in a time when under-investment 
has meant that the infrastructure of the pits has become increasingly 
outmoded and unfit for production. Poor man management has had three 
effects. 
Firstly, by losing the older, more experienced men productivity may 
decline, for lost skills means pits may increasingly witness time lost through 
machine breakdowns due to the lack of craftsmen to solve difficulties, a 
shortage of workers with experience of face problems, or of the necessary 
men to ensure materials get quickly to the point of need. Secondly, reduced 
manpower means that the remaining miners have had to spend more time 
working overtime to make up for worker shortages, leading to 
overtiredness on a job where mental alertness, or lack of it, may save or lose 
lives. Related to this may be the problem of high absenteeism due to 
overwork, and the disruption of the work schedule as men choose to work 
on shifts that will pay overtime rather than normal rates. Thirdly, 
undermanning has led to BC introducing contractors into the Scottish pits. 
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The advantages of contractors in pits without a guaranteed future are clear, 
for short-term contracts are more flexible and inexpensive; and BC does 
not have to pay redundancy money if a pit closes. Yet contractors have 
exacerbated difficulties for industrial relations in the industry for the 
miners resent the presence of such workers, often more highly-paid for the 
same work in their collieries. 
All the factors outlined above have served to enhance the last major 
problem for the Scottish industry; namely, the profound demoralisation of 
the Scottish miners since the miners' strike. All too clearly aware of the 
under-investment in their collieries, the closures taking place around them 
which further limit employment opportunities, and the problems inhibiting 
productivity, all Scottish miners interviewed since the strike have attested 
to the belief that the Scottish pits will soon no longer exist. Under such 
circumstances, with morale at rock bottom, the will to mine coal has been 
lost. Even the Scottish Area Director, George McAlpine, has expressed 
grave concern over this issue. He stated, in May 1988 in relation to the 
ongoing feud with the SSEB:-
"Our current below-par performance is undoubtably related to the 
fact that we have been living on the edge of a precipice, not knowing 
whether we will have a market for the coal we produce(8l." 
Yet this crisis of morale has been in existence, as stated earlier, from 
prior to the current crisis, and whilst exacerbated by the SSEB dispute, 
demoralisation has been caused by BC's lack of commitment to the Scottish 
pits over the last 9 years, and more recently, since the end of the strike. All 
the points raised generally above can be amply demonstrated in the case of 
Seafield Colliery in Fife, which was closed in March 1988 for being 
'unproductive'. A brief examination of the salient points raised by this 
closure will thus illustrate the crisis in the Scottish industry. 
Seafield Colliery: A Test Case 
Sunk in 1954, Seafield was to be one of the modern, mechanised pits 
upon which the young nationalised industry was to place its hopes. Drawing 
upon the rich reserves lying under the Forth, specialising in high quality 
household coals, it lay within the Fife coalfield, which was designated as the 
growth area of the Scottish coalfield by the NCB(9l. To it were drawn men 
from all over the coalfield as older pits were shut. By 1979 it had an average 
yearly workforce of 2173. However, by 1984 this had dropped to some 1855 
men, with further reductions being made in the wake of the strike, with only 
around 1050 miners starting in 1985. Two new faces were being brought 
into operation at this time to replace the older faces ceasing production, 
Lll and D17. One of the new faces, the LIS, was lost due to fire in January 
1987, and consequently the remaining new face, the D19, was rushed into 
production. During the same period the workforce suffered further 
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reductions from 820 to 680. By 1987, Seafield was thus dependent upon 
only one face for its survival, and working with a much reduced workforce. 
To guarantee the pit's future, therefore, new investment was 
imperative. This issue had become vital by Spring 1987, for the D19 had a 
life expectancy of some 2 years, approximately the same period as that 
necessary to bring a new face into production. However, when Mr 
McAlpine stated on 6th May 1987 that £10 million was to be invested in a 
new face, the D52, this was made contingent upon maintaining a 
production target of some 4 tonnes OMS; a higher target than the average 
for the British coalfield at that time. The management then claimed that the 
pit failed consistently to meet this target and on the 25th November Mr 
McAlpine stated that the pit had 6 weeks to meet the 4 tonnes OMS or the 
pit would close. He estimated that the pit would lose some £11 million in 
1987/88. The closure decision was announced on the 11th January 1988. It 
was a decision which would mean the irredeemable loss of reserves of some 
100 million tonnes, and related jobs, to the Scottish economy. 
The closure of Seafield was, on the surface, caused by failure to meet 
BC's criteria for productivity. But the issue is not as simple as it seems, for 
managerial decisions and targets had placed the pit in a position which 
made it virtually impossible to succeed. The productivity target was set 
against ideal criteria wherein constant coal shear could be maintained, yet 
there were several factors which prevented this being achieved. 
Firstly, Seafield, by its nature, was subject to geological difficulties, 
such as steep seams and coals prone to spontaneous combustion, which 
created particular problems for working. Secondly, failure to invest in the 
infrastructure of the pit resulted in problems in maintaining production. 
Between April and May 1987 breakdowns on the 6 year old conveyor belt 
systems, not modernised due to lack of cash, lost the pit an average of2 to 3 
shifts a week as production haltedl10l. In September, problems over 
excessive dust led to a strike, and in the same month when the shearer 
broke down, managerial insensitivity in dealing with the issue led to a 
further strike. Thirdly, MAT was lessened due to under-investment in man-
riding systems conveying men to and from their work. The face at Seafield 
was some 6 kilometres from the pit bottom and took over one hour to reach. 
Travel was by a combination of man-riding 'boggies' and a belt, with the last 
kilometre or so by foot, in wet conditions and excessively humid heat. The 
SCP estimated that some 3 hours 19 minutes were spent daily in travelling, 
thus reducing MAT to 4 hours 17 minutesl11 l. Union officials constantly 
raised the isue of manriding facilities at Joint Consultative Committees, yet 
Mr McAlpine argued it was hard to get investment given Seafield's 
productivity statistics02l. 
Problems with under-investment were compounded by redundancies 
at the pit, for many workers leaving the industry were from the skilled 
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grades increasingly needed to maintain equipment. In March 1985 there 
had been 245 skilled workers at Seafield. By the end of 1986 111 had left, 
with a further 82leaving after the loss of the L15. By the end of 1987 only 92 
skilled men were left at the pitl13l. These losses presented two problems. 
Firstly, essential maintenance was neglected due to a shortage of the 
necessary men, and, secondly, workers had to put in increasing amounts of 
overtime, leading to overtiredness. The SCP notes that despite a great 
reduction in the workforce between 1985 and 1987, overtime hours worked 
remain roughly at the same level, indicating a greater burden on remaining 
menl 14l 
After the fire, by April 1987, some 80 Cementation contractors were 
brought into the pit. This move worsened the situation in two ways. The 
contractors were being paid at higher rates than the BC workforce. This 
became known to the men as the contractors' paylines were sent to their 
homes rather than given to them at the pit, and led to a great deal of 
resentment. Further, these higher wages were counted as part of Seafield's 
costs. When taken in addition to the redundancy payments made at the 
beginning of the year, this enhanced the pit's weak financial position. 
In this atmosphere the morale of the men plummetted. Initially 
enspirited by news of the investment production figures rose from the end 
of May 1987, yet from July output dropped again as the men began to 
realise that the £10 million would not come05l. Yet demoralisation was not 
the result purely of the events of 1987. When fieldwork commenced in the 
aftermath of the strike there was already a clear crisis of confidence among 
the Seafield men. As early as late 1985 men were predicting that the pit 
would be shut in the immediate future. They saw this as a fact; merely the 
date was uncertain. The rundown of the Scottish Area, managerial 
attitudes and lack of investment were already discernible signs to the men 
that their pit would be lost. Understanding the criteria by which their pit 
was judged, they foresaw that crisis would come. The last shift was on the 
18th March 1988. 
This example shows us how BC's policies and decision-making have 
brought about a self-fulfilling prophecy of crisis to Scottish pits. Yet they 
also carry ramifications for Scottish markets in coal. It is to the main trends 
in this area that we now briefly turn. 
Coal Markets in Scotland 
By 1987/88, closures in Scotland have reduced the deep-mine capacity 
to some 2. 6 million tonnes per annum, a reduction of. 8 million tonnes from 
1986/87 caused by the closures of Seafield and Monktonhall. A further 2.4 
million tonnes came from BC opencast, and c.5 million tonnes from private 
opencast during this earlier year. Of this 4.8 million tonnes went to the 
SSEB, BC's largest Scottish customer06l. This concentration on the 'easy' 
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market of the power stations has encouraged certain key trends in Scottish 
domestic markets, engendering a situation wherein Scotland, as with 
England, has become overly dependent upon the power station market to 
the detriment of other potential markets. 
Marketing priorities have increasingly turned from specialist products, 
a policy which has led to closures of household coal pits such as Seafield and 
Comrie, and coking coal pits such as Cardowan and Polkemmet. The 
closure of these latter, for example, means that in 1986/87 Ravenscraig 
imported 2.6 million tonnes of coking coal at over £80 million due to the 
lack of available sources in Scotland. Today, domestic coal demand also is 
met by coals from outwith Scotland. 
The closures ofthe Frances (1985), Killoch (1986) and Seafield (1988) 
mean that only Bilston Glen still produces household coals. Demand is 
therefore increasingly met by English coals, (for example, from Kellingley 
and Broadsworth), Welsh anthracite and manufactured fuels. Yet even 
here BC is not satisfying its market. Merchants and agents complain of bad 
quality, often caused by bad preparation, high prices and broken 
agreements for tonnages and sizes. Merchants are increasingly turning to 
alternative fuel supplies, whether imports or private opencast. 
Much ofthis trend results from the miners' strike when, because offuel 
shortages, other sources had to be found. In the aftermath of the strike the 
above problems with BC meant that many chose to stay with their new 
suppliers. Merchants prefer the cheaper prices, often savings in excess of 
£10 per tonne for foreign and opencast coals, the willingness of suppliers to 
fulfil contracts, and the greater choice in coals. Many argue that foreign and 
opencast coals are of superior quality, they have more come-back on 
opencast suppliers, and can readily change a foreign source. 
Private opencast has been the main gainer from BC's problems. 
Scotland is the major opencast producer in Britain, and merchants find that 
they have greater access to such coals than with BC, which supplies from 
the south. But foreign coals are becoming increasingly available with 
overseas suppliers eager to break into Scottish markets. This trend goes 
unchecked largely due to BC's apparent lack of interest in the domestic coal 
market. Merchants complain, for example, that BC prefers to supply the 
SSEB as quality and preparation are unimportant to the power station 
market. Further, they claim, certainly with evidence in the case of Seafield, 
for example, that good household coals, which their customers seek, are 
being crushed to supply the power stations. 
More importantly, BC is not fighting to retrieve lost Scottish markets 
which, indeed, seem as peripheral to its concerns as Scottish production. 
One large merchant, for example, argued that prior to the strike his 
company had bought £250,000 of BC's coals yearly, but that in 1987 they 
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had bought only £10,000. Yet BC had made no attempt to contact the 
dealer to enquire whether there was a problem. Solid Fuel Advisory 
Service employees confirm such statements, by arguing that BC's concerns 
are dominated by the English market, and that marketing strategies are not 
sensitive to Scottish needs. Further they complain that too many resources 
are being wasted on unproductive schemes and given to private commercial 
agencies. 
BC, therefore, appears to have abdicated from the declining Scottish 
market. With coal consumption coming under strong attack from gas and 
electricity, BC is failing to attempt to secure existing markets. At the 
present time Scottish household coals come largely from private opencast 
licensees, who pay BC a levy of £14 per tonne, and this is the only Scottish 
growth area, with some 23.3 million tonnes of opencast reserves with 
planning approval for either BC or private development. Failure to invest 
in the Scottish industry thus means not only declining jobs, whether directly 
in the pits or in associated industries, but also has weakened the domestic 
economy through the growth of imports. This failure may well become 
increasingly important to the Scottish economy in the future. 
Conclusion 
BC has, increasingly oriented its production to the English coalfield 
and, by failure to invest, critically undermined the Scottish industry. Yet its 
policies are extremely shortsighted for several reasons. 
The over-dependence on the SSEB may well prove crucial in the next 
few years. The SSEB has commissioned 1 ,400MW of new nuclear capacity 
in 1988/89, and with the Torness AGR coming on stream SSEB demand is 
anticipated to fall from 4.8 million tonnes to 2.5 million(17). Already in 
1986/87, some 40% of this was met by opencast supplies, and by the 1990s 
the entire amount could be met from this source. Further, the government 
has stipulated that 25% of privatised electricity must be bought from 
nuclear energy at whatever the cost. The SSEB market, therefore, could 
well be lost. 
This shortsightedness also manifests itself in relation to the 
international scenario. Although gas production is increasing, oil reserves 
are expected to be scarce by the mid-21st century. The future of the nuclear 
energy industry is still uncertain. The USA, for example, has not built any 
nuclear reactors for some 10 years, and has been expanding coal-fired 
capacity. In terms of BC's competitiveness on the world market, the 
current low prices are not expected to continue. There have already been 
world price increases from autumn 1987 as foreign pits selling at below 
production cost prices have closed. The SCP estimates that by the mid-
1990s the world price will be higher than that of Scottish coals. Closures 
brought about by short-term policy decisions could thus prove more costly 
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to the economy than already realised, for the end of the industry would 
mean the reliance on foreign supplies. Domestic supplies could not be met 
by the limited opencast reserves, for these are too small fully to replace 
deep-mined coals. 
The picture, however, is not necessarily as gloomy as it appears, for 
several options are open to the Scottish mining industry. For example, the 
SSEB currently has excess capacity, which provides the potential for 
sending coal-generated electricity down the wire to England. The 400KV 
line and two 275KV lines linked to the Stella sub-station in Newcastle offer 
the possibility of sending some 1,500 MW to England, and would help 
overcome the financial burden involved with current plans to build eight 
new stations in the south of England<18l. Scandinavian power stations, 
which have ceilings on sulphur content, (for example, Sweden has a limit of 
.8% ), offer potential markets for Scotland's low sulphur coals, such as that 
which would come from a newly-developed Frances Colliery. Ireland also 
offers a nearby market for it possesses few fossil fuels. Scotland could thus 
have a profitable future in industrial coals. 
With household coals BC has three main possible options. Firstly, it 
could increase profitability by operating its own shops, something like 
British Gas shops, selling appliances and fuels, thereby cutting out the 
middle men. Secondly, it could exploit its opencast reserves itself, for if 
private suppliers can make profits after paying BC a levy, then surely BC 
could also make a profitable business from opencast coals, whilst operating 
a responsible policy of exploiting these limited reserves. Thirdly, it must 
secure markets in the highlands before more isolated areas are opened up 
by gas supplies. 
These examples highlight certain potentialities for BC, and indicate 
that the current crisis is reversible. They must, on no account, be seen as 
exhaustive, however, but serve merely to demonstrate potential strategies 
which would generate a viable Scottish mining industry. They seek to 
illustrate that what is necessary to re-establish a productive industry is not 
the mere presence of coal, for that is abundant, but the will, the political 
will, so to do. 
Suzanne Najam, Department of Sociology, University of Edinburgh. 
Researcher for the Scottish Coalfield Project. 
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